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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
SOUTHERN DIVISION 
No. 7:08-CV-140-D
LORENE WILLIAMS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) ORDER
)
BRUNSWICK COUNTY BOARD OF )
EDUCATION, )
)
Defendant. )
Lorene Williams (“Williams” or “plaintiff’) filed suit against the Brunswick County Board 
o f Education (“Board” or “defendant”). Williams alleges that the Board violated Title I o f the 
Americans with Disabilities Act o f 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§12111-12117, and Section 504 of 
the Rehabilitation Act o f 1973,29 U.S.C. § 794, when it transferred her from Director o f Pre-K and 
Student Services to Dean o f Students at Shallotte Middle School. The transfer resulted in no loss 
o f pay, benefits, or seniority. The Board seeks summary judgment and contends that Williams is not 
disabled within the meaning o f the ADA or Rehabilitation Act, that the transfer did not constitute 
adverse employment action, and that there is no evidence o f unlawful discrimination (including 
unlawful retaliation). As explained below, the court grants summary judgment to the Board.
I .
Williams has worked for the Board since 1975. See Williams Dep. 32-33. From 1975 to 
1985, Williams served in various classroom roles. See id. at 33. From 1985 to 1996, Williams 
served as Director o f  Exceptional Children’s Program. Id. From 1996 to June 2005, Williams 
served as Director o f Federal Programs. Id. In June 2005, Williams again became Director of 
Exceptional Children’s Program. Id.: McGee Aff. 12-19. In December 2005, due to performance
concerns, Superintendent Katie McGee transferred Williams to Director o f  Pre-K and Student 
Services. See McGee Aff. 21-37; see also Babson Aff. 1 5.
In early June 2007, Superintendent McGee decided to recommend Williams’ transfer to a 
position as Dean o f Students at Shallotte Middle School. McGee AfF. f f  46-54. Superintendent 
McGee believed that Williams would be able to work with the at-risk students at Shallotte Middle 
School in light o f  W illiams’ skills and ties to the Shallotte community. See id. f f  7, 52. 
Superintendent McGee decided to make the recommendation to the Board as part o f a reorganization 
plan involving fifteen employees. See id. Iff 46, 54, 56.
On June 4, 2007, Williams submitted a letter to her immediate supervisor, Dr. Zelphia 
Grissett, requesting a six-month medical leave o f absence from June 8,2007, through December 8, 
2007. Williams Dep. 100; Id., Ex. 5. In her letter, Williams explained her plan to use her 
accumulated sick leave due to her “diabetic levels” and “accompanying gynecological problems.” 
Id  Ex. 5.
On June 5,2007, before the Board meeting, Superintendent McGee advised the employees 
subject to her transfer recommendations about the recommendations. See McGee AfF. f f  46, 56. 
As for Williams, Superintendent McGee met with Williams in person to tell her o f the recommended 
transfer. Id. f  57. Williams was upset and told Superintendent McGee that she wanted to remain 
as Director o f Pre-K and Student Services. Id. f f  57, 64. When Superintendent McGee met with 
Williams, she knew that Williams had requested a six-month medical leave o f absence, but did not 
know about the request when she decided to recommend the transfer. Id. f  59.
On June 5,2007, the Board approved Superintendent McGee’s reorganization plan, including 
Williams’ transfer to Dean o f Students at Shallotte Middle School. See id. f  46. The transfer did 
not impact Williams’ salary, benefits, or seniority. See Williams Dep. 111-12; Baily AfF f  5. 
Williams was upset about the transfer and asked the Board to meet with her to permit her to contest 
the transfer. See Williams Dep. 51,59-60; McGee AfF f  66. Although the Board was not required 
to meet with Williams, the Board granted her request for a meeting. See Babson AfF f  9; Miller AfF 
16.
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On June 12,2007, Williams visited her physician, Dr. James Wortman, and told him that she 
was taking a six-month medical leave o f absence. Wortman Dep. 32-33. Williams told Dr. 
Wortman that her leave “means nothing” and that she was due the sick leave. See id. at 38-39. Dr. 
Wortman never advised Williams that she needed a six-month medical leave o f absence. Id  at 40. 
In fact, no medical professional ever advised Williams that she needed a six-month medical leave 
o f absence. See Williams Dep. 104—05.
In June 2007, Williams’ gynecologist, Dr. Susan Wilson, told Williams that she might need 
surgery if  the polyps in her uterus were cancerous. See id. at 104-05, 184,187-88, 224-25. The 
polyps, however, were not cancerous, and Williams received outpatient treatment in late June 2007 
to remove the polyps. See id. at 207-08,225.
On July 2,2007, Williams met with die Board to contest her transfer to Dean o f Students at 
Shallotte Middle School. See Milligan Aff. 7-9; Babson Aff. f  10; Miller Aff. f  7; Hobbs Aff.
Tf 5. At the meeting, Williams asked the Board to permit her to remain as Director o f Pre-K and 
Student Services until she retired and claimed that Superintendent McGee did not value her skills 
and abilities and personally disliked her. See Milligan Aff. fflf 8-9; Hobbs A ff fflf 5-6; see also 
Babson Aff. 110; Miller Aff. f  7.
On August 7, 2007, Superintendent McGee submitted a written response to the Board 
explaining her rationale for recommending Williams’ transfer. See McGee Aff., Ex. 8. Again, Dr. 
McGee noted Williams’ ability to work with at-risk students at Shallotte Middle School and her ties 
to the Shallotte community. See id. On August 27, 2007, the Board voted to uphold Williams’ 
transfer. See Milligan A ff If 11. The Board members testified that Williams’ health did not affect 
the decision to transfer Williams and they had no knowledge that Williams was diabetic when the 
decision was made. See id. 1 12; Babson A ff f  13; Miller A ff ^ 9; Hobbs Aff. f 8.
Williams would have returned to work in August 2007 if  the Board had permitted her to 
return as Director o f Pre-K and Student Services. See Williams Dep. 211-12. Instead, Williams
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remained on sick leave until January 2008. Id. at 210-11. During her sick leave, Williams visited 
with relatives, relaxed, and took a vacation to the Caribbean. See id. at 212. Williams returned to 
work in January 2008, and has served as the Dean o f Students at Shallotte Middle School since that 
time. See id. at 33,211; McGee Aff. 1 68.
n.
Summary judgment is appropriate when, after reviewing the record taken as a whole, no 
genuine issue o f material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter o f law. 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc.. 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The party 
seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden o f demonstrating the absence o f a genuine issue 
o f material fact. Celotex Corp. v, Catrett. 477 U.S. 317.323 (19861. Once the moving party has met 
its burden, the nonmoving party may not rest on the allegations or denials in its pleading, Anderson. 
477 U.S. at 248, but “must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue 
for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quotation 
omitted) (emphasis removed). A trial court reviewing a motion for summary judgment should 
determine whether a genuine issue o f material fact exists for trial. Anderson. 477 U.S. at 249. In 
making this determination, the court must view the evidence and the inferences drawn therefrom in 
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Scott v. Harris. 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007).
A.
Williams has no direct evidence o f disability discrimination concerning her June 2007 
transfer and proceeds under the McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting framework. See Rhoads v. 
FDIC. 257 F.3d 373, 387 n .l 1, 391-92 (4th Cir. 2001) (applying McDonnell-Douglas framework 
to ADA claim); Hooven-Lewis v. Caldera. 249 F.3d 259, 267-71 (4th Cir. 2001) (applying 
McDonnell-Douglas framework to Rehabilitation Act claim). Under that framework, Williams 
initially must establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that: (1) she is within the ADA’s 
protected class; (2) she suffered adverse employment action; (3) at the time o f the adverse
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employment action, she was performing her job at a level that met her employer’s legitimate 
expectations; and (4) the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances giving rise to a 
reasonable inference o f unlawful discrimination. See Rhoads. 257 F.3d at 387 n. 11; Ennis v. Nat’l 
Ass’n o f Business & Educ. Radio. Inc.. 53 F.3d 55,58 (4th Cir. 1995); c f  Hooven-Lewis. 249 F.3d 
at 266-67. If Williams establishes a prima facie case, the Board then must articulate a legitimate 
non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. See, e ^ ,  Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez. 
540 U.S. 44, 49-50 (2003); St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks. 509 U.S. 502, 506-07 (1993); Tex. 
Dep’t o f Cmtv. Affairs v. Burdine. 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). If the Board meets this burden of 
production, Williams must prove by a preponderance o f the evidence that the Board’s stated reason 
for the adverse employment action was a mere pretext for unlawful discrimination. See, e.e.. Reeves 
v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods.. Inc.. 530 U.S. 133,143 (2000). “[T]he plaintiff can prove pretext 
by showing that the [employer’s] explanation is unworthy o f credence or by offering other forms of 
circumstantial evidence sufficiently probative o f [disability discrimination].” Price v. Thompson. 
380 F.3d 209,212 (4th Cir. 2004) (quotations omitted); see Mereish v. Walker. 359 F.3d 330,336 
(4th Cir. 2004).
The Board argues that Williams has failed to establish her prima facie case because (1) in 
June 2007 she did not have a disability as defined in the ADA or Rehabilitation Act; (2) the transfer 
did not constitute adverse employment action; and (3) the transfer did not arise under circumstances 
giving rise to a reasonable inference o f unlawful discrimination. See Def.’s Mem. 7-20.1
Initially, the court must decide whether to apply the ADA Amendments Act o f 2008 
(“ADAAA”) in this case. See ADAAA, Pub. L. No. 110-325,122 Stat. 3553. On September 25, 
2008, President George W. Bush signed the ADAAA, and the ADAAA made substantial changes
'The court interprets the Rehabilitation Act using the law applicable to the ADA. See, e.g.. 
Hooven-Lewis. 249 F.3d at 268; Baird ex rel. Baird v. Rose. 192 F.3d 462,468-69 (4th Cir. 1999); 
Mvers v. Hose. 50 F.3d 278,281 (4th Cir. 1995).
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to the ADA, including changes to the definition o f disability. See id. § 4,122 Stat. at 3555-57. The 
ADAAA did not, however, take effect until January 1, 2009. See id. § 8, 122 Stat. at 3559. 
Moreover, the ADAAA does not apply retroactively; therefore, the court applies the ADA (including 
the definition o f disability) in effect in June 2007. See, e.g.. Ragusa v. Malveme Union Free Sch. 
Dist.. No. 08-5367-CV, 2010 WL 2490966, at *1 n.2 (2d Cir. June 21,2010) (unpublished); Shin 
v. Univ. of Md. Med. Svs. Corp.. No. 09-1126,2010 WL 850176, at *5 n. 14 (4th Cir. Mar. 11,2010) 
(unpublished); Johnson v. Weld County. 594 F.3d 1202,1217 n.7 (10th Cir. 2010); Kania v. Potter. 
358 Fed. Appx. 338, 341 n.5 (3d Cir. 2009) (unpublished); Becerril v. Pima Countv Assessor’s 
Office. 587 F.3d 1162,1164 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); Thornton v. United Parcel Serv„ Inc.. 587 
F .3d27,34n.3  (1st Cir. 2009); Fredricksen v. United Parcel Serv.. Co.. 581 F.3d 516,521 n.l (7th 
Cir. 2009); Lvtes v. DC Water & Sewer Auth.. 572 F.3d 936,942 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Milholland v. 
Sumner Countv Bd. o f Educ.. 569 F.3d 562,565 (6th Cir. 2009); EEOC v. Agro Distribution. LLC. 
555 F.3d 462,469 n.8 (5th Cir. 2009). The same definition o f disability also applies to plaintiffs 
Rehabilitation Act claims. See 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B); Hooven-Lewis. 249 F.3d at 268-69.
In order to fall within the ADA’s or Rehabilitation Act’s protected class, a person must be 
a “qualified individual with a disability.” See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); 29 U.S.C. §§ 705(20)(B), 
794(a); Rohan v. Networks Presentations LLC. 375 F.3d 266,272 (4th Cir. 2004); Rhoads. 257 F.3d 
at 387. An individual is disabled under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act if  she has “a physical or 
mental impairment that substantially limits [her in] one or m ore. . .  major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12102(2)(A); see 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B). Under the ADA, a person can claim an actual 
impairment or claim that her employer “regarded” her as having such an impairment. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12102(2); 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B).
In this case, Williams contends that she was actually disabled in June 2007 and that the Board 
regarded her as disabled in June 2007. In support, Williams cites her diabetes and the effect that her 
diabetes had on her health. See Pl.’s Resp. 1-2,6.
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Simply because a person has a physical impairment (such as diabetes) does not mean that the 
person falls within the ADA’s protected class. See, e.g.. Toyota Motor Mfg.. Kv„ Inc, v. Williams. 
534 U.S. 184, 195 (2002), abrogated by statute. ADAAA, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553; 
Hooven-Lewis. 249 F.3d at 269-71. Rather, under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, a person 
must show that her physical impairment “substantially limits one or more o f [her] major life 
activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A); see 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(B), (20)(B). “Substantially limits” 
means “[significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual 
can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, maimer, or duration under 
which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity.” 29 
C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1 )(ii). Examples o f“major life activities” include “caring for oneself, performing 
manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” Id. § 1630.2(i); 
see Williams. 534 U.S. at 198; Heiko v. Colombo Sav. Bank. F.S.B.. 434 F.3d 249, 255 (4th Cir. 
2006); Rhoads. 257 F.3d at 387; Hooven-Lewis. 249 F.3d at 269.
Williams asserts that her diabetes substantially limited her in the major life activity of 
working. C f  Pl.’s Resp. 1-2. However, Williams’ doctors never suggested that she needed a six- 
month medical leave o f absence due to her diabetes or any other physical impairment. See Wortman 
Dep. 33,40; Williams Dep. 104-05. Moreover, although Williams did have non-cancerous polyps 
removed in late June 2007, such a temporary impairment does not qualify as a disability under the 
ADA or Rehabilitation Act. See, e.g.. Pollard v. High’s o f Baltimore. Inc.. 281 F.3d 462,467-72 
(4th Cir. 2002); Halperin v. Abacus Tech. Corp.. 128 F.3d 191,199 (4th Cir. 1997), abrogated on 
other grounds by Baird. 192 F.3d 462. Similarly, to the extent that Williams sometimes felt 
symptoms due to her diabetes (such as dizziness or ankle swelling), such temporary symptoms do 
not mean that she was disabled under the ADA. See, e.g.. Pollard. 281 F.3d 467-72; Halperin. 128 
F.3d at 199. Furthermore, Williams’ testimony that she felt sick in June 2007 (Williams Dep. 187) 
does not mean that she had a “disability” under the ADA. Simply put, Williams’ self-diagnosis of
7
feeling sick in June 2007 due to her diabetes does not mean that she had a physical impairment that 
substantially limited her ability to perform the major life activity o f working. See, e.g.. Hooven- 
Lewis. 249 F.3d at 269-71; accord Williams. 534 U.S. at 198-99; Sutton v. United Air Lines. Inc.. 
527 U.S. 471.492-93 ('19991 superseded bv statute. AD AAA. Pub. L.No. 110-325,122 Stat.3553.
As for Williams’ contention that the Board “regarded” her as disabled in June 2007, 
Williams must show that “(1) her employer mistakenly believed that she has a physical impairment 
that substantially limits one or more major life activities, or (2) her employer mistakenly believed 
that an actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 
Rhoads. 257 F.3d at 390 (quotations and alterations omitted); see Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489; 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12102(2)(C). However, Superintendent McGee decided to recommend the transfer before she 
knew about Williams’ requested sick leave, and Williams’ health had nothing to do with the transfer 
recommendation. See McGee Aff. f f  46, 59-61. Moreover, the Board did not know about 
Williams’ diabetes or sick-leave request when it approved the transfer. See Babson Aff. f f  7-13; 
Hobbs Aff. 4—8; Miller Aff. f f  5-9; Milligan Aff. f f  6-12; c f  Hooven-Lewis. 249 F.3d at 278 
(plaintiff cannot prove causation without showing that the decisionmaker actually had knowledge 
o f the protected activity or status at the time o f the alleged adverse employment action); Gibson v. 
Old Town Trolley Tours o f Wash.. D.C.. Inc.. 160 F.3d 177,181-82 (4th Cir. 1998) (same); Dowe 
v. Total Action Against Poverty in Roanoke Valiev. 145 F.3d 653, 657 (4th Cir. 1998) (same). 
Furthermore, the Board members who voted to approve her transfer denied transferring Williams 
because o f her health or her sick-leave request. See Babson Aff. f  13; Hobbs Aff. f  8; Miller Aff. 
1 9; Milligan Aff. f  12. Finally, the Board’s decision to transfer Williams to the position o f Dean 
o f Students at Shallotte Middle School belies any suggestion that the Board regarded Williams as 
being disabled. See, e.g.. Rhoads. 257 F.3d at 390-91; Haulbrook v. Michelin N. Am.. Inc.. 252 
F.3d 696,703-04 (4th Cir. 2001); Hooven-Lewis. 249 F.3d at 270-71. Because Williams has failed 
to demonstrate that she is within the ADA’s or Rehabilitation Act’s protected class, she has failed
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to establish a prima facie case, and the Board is entitled to summary judgment.
Alternatively, Williams’ prima facie case fails because she has failed to demonstrate that she 
suffered an adverse employment action in being transferred from Director of Pre-K and Student 
Services to Dean of Students at Shallotte Middle School. As mentioned, the transfer had no impact 
on Williams’ salary, benefits, or seniority. See Williams Dep. 111-12; Bailey Aff. f 5.
Initially, the parties dispute what constitutes an adverse employment action in the context of 
Williams’ ADA and Rehabilitation Act substantive claim. The dispute concerns whether to apply 
the “adverse employment action” standard that the Supreme Court announced in Burlington Northem 
& Santa Fe Railway v. White. 548 U.S. 53 (2006). In Burlington Northern, the Supreme Court 
analyzed Title VII’s antiretaliation provision2 and contrasted it with Title VII’s substantive 
antidiscrimination provision.3 See id. at 61-67. The Court noted that Title VC’s substantive
242 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against 
any o f his employees or applicants for employment, for an employment agency, or 
joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or 
retraining, including on-the-job training programs, to discriminate against any 
individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate against any member thereof or 
applicant for membership, because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful 
employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, 
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing 
under this subchapter.
342 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges o f employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any 
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual o f employment
9
antidiscrimination provision is limited to actions that affect employment or alter the conditions of 
the workplace, such as discharge or a material change in compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privilege o f employment. Id. at 61-62. In contrast, the Court noted that “the antiretaliation 
provision [in Title VH], unlike the substantive provision, is not limited to discriminatory actions that 
affect the terms and conditions o f employment.” Id. at 64. Rather, a plaintiff may satisfy the 
requirement o f adverse employment action under Title VIPs antiretaliation provision by showing that 
“a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, which in this 
context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge 
o f discrimination.” Id. at 68 (quotations omitted).
Every circuit court to address this issue (including the Fourth Circuit) has held that 
Burlington Northem’s adverse-employment action standard does not apply to Title VII’s substantive 
antidiscrimination provision. See, e.g.. Fincher v. Depository Trust & Clearing Corp,. 604 F.3d 712, 
720 n.6 (2d Cir. 2010); Morales-Vallellanes v. Potter. 605 F.3d 27,35-36 (1st Cir. 2010); Gauiacq 
v. EPF. Inc.. 601 F.3d 565,577 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Rodriguez v. Pierce Countv. 267 Fed. Appx. 556, 
557 (9th Cir. 2008) (unpublished); Osahar v. Postmaster Gen, of U.S. Postal Serv.. 263 Fed. Appx. 
753,761 n.8 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (unpublished); Michael v. Caterpillar Fin. Servs. Corp.. 
496 F.3d 584,593-94 (6th Cir. 2007); McCov v. City of Shreveport. 492 F.3d 551,559-60 (5th Cir. 
2007) (per curiam); Piercv v. Maketa. 480 F.3d 1192,1203 (10th Cir. 2007); Higgins v. Gonzales. 
481 F.3d 578,589-91 (8th Cir. 2007); Brockman v. Snow. 217 Fed. Appx. 201,205-06 & n.3 (4th 
Cir. 2007) (unpublished); Szvmanski v. Countv of Cook. 468 F.3d 1027, 1029 (7th Cir. 2006); 
Moore v. City of Philadelphia. 461 F.3d 331,341-42 (3d Cir. 2006). As for Title VII’s substantive 
antidiscrimination provision, the Fourth Circuit continues to require that a plaintiff show an
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because o f such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
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‘“ultimate employment’ action that affects ‘hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, and 
compensating.’” Snow. 217 Fed. Appx. at 205 (quoting Page v. Bolger, 645 F.2d 227,233 (4th Cir. 
1981) (en banc)). In light o f the difference in language between the ADA’s and the Rehabilitation 
Act’s substantive antidiscrimination provisions4 and the antiretaliation provisions,5 this court 
concludes that Williams must show an “ultimate employment” action on her substantive ADA and 
Rehabilitation Act claims. See, e.g.. James v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.. 354 Fed. Appx. 246, 
248-49 (6th Cir. 2009) (unpublished); Buboltz v. Residential Advantages. Inc.. 523 F.3d 864, 
868-69 (8th Cir. 2008); Snow. 217 Fed. Appx. at 205-06; c£ Hennagir v. Utah Dep’t o f Corr.. 587 
F.3d 1255, 1266 (10th Cir. 2009) (recognizing adoption o f Burlington Northern’s Title VII 
retaliation standard in the ADA retaliation context).
In light o f the undisputed evidence that the transfer to Dean o f Students did not affect 
Williams’ pay, benefits, or seniority, the transfer does not constitute adverse employment action. 
See, e.g.. James v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton. Inc.. 368 F.3d 371, 375 (4th Cir. 2004); Boone v. 
Goldin. 178 F.3d 253,256-57 (4th Cir. 1999). Williams’ “opinion” that being transferred from the 
central office to a school constitutes a demotion is not enough to transform the transfer into adverse 
employment action. See, e.g.. James. 368 F.3d at 375; Boone. 178 F.3d at 256-57. Indeed, the 
record shows that such transfers are not uncommon. See McGee Aff. |  53. Thus, the Board is 
entitled to summary judgment.
Finally, even assuming that Williams falls within the protected class and assuming that the 
transfer is an adverse employment action, the transfer did not occur under circumstances giving rise 
to a reasonable inference o f unlawful discrimination. Williams testified that she was diagnosed with 
diabetes in 1995. See Williams Pep. 77-78. Superintendent McGee supervised Williams for a good
4See 42 U.S.C. § 12112; 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), (d).
5See 42 U.S.C. § 12203; 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), (d).
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portion of time between 1995 and 2007, knew about her diabetes, and gave her good performance 
reviews. See id. at 76-77,79-80; McGee Aff. f f  3 ,5 -6 . Although Williams’ working relationship 
with Superintendent McGee deteriorated over time, not even Williams believes that the relationship 
deteriorated due to her diabetes. See id. 151-52; c f  McGee Aff. f f  12-45. In short, no reasonable 
factfinder could infer that Superintendent McGee decided to recommend Williams’ transfer due to 
her diabetes and then convinced the Board to do so. C f  Tavlor v. Va. Union Univ.. 193 F.3d 219, 
231 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (discussing same-actor inference), abrogated m part on other grounds 
by Desert Palace. Inc, v. Costa. 539 U.S. 90 (2003); Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co.. 80 
F.3d 954,959 (4th Cir. 1996) (same); Tyndall v. Nat’l Educ. Ctrs.. Inc.. 31 F.3d 209,214-15 (4th 
Cir. 1994) (same); Proud v. Stone. 945 F.2d 796,797 (4th Cir. 1991) (same). Because Williams has 
failed to establish a prima facie case, the Board is entitled to summary judgment on her claim that 
the 2007 transfer violated the ADA or Rehabilitation Act.
B.
Williams also contends that the Board transferred her to Dean o f Students at Shallotte Middle 
School in violation o f the antiretaliation provisions in the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. See Compl. 
f t  11-12; 42 U.S.C. §12203(a); 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), (d). Once again, Williams lacks any direct 
evidence o f retaliation, and proceeds under the McDonnell-Douglas framework. In order to establish 
a prima facie case under that framework, Williams must show that (1) she engaged in protected 
activity; (2) her employer took an action against her which a reasonable employee would find 
materially adverse; and (3) the employer took the materially adverse employment action because of 
the protected activity. See, e.g.. Reinhardt v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch. Bd. o f Educ.. 595 F.3d 1126, 
1131 (10th Cir. 2010) (applying Burlington Northern to Rehabilitation Act retaliation claim and 
noting ADA standard is the same); Shannon v. Postmaster Gen. ofU.S. Postal Serv.. 335 Fed. Appx. 
21,26 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (unpublished) (same); Burks v. Wis. Dep’t o f Transp.. 464 F.3d 
744,756 n.12,758 & n.16 (7th Cir. 2006) (samel: see also Warren v. Goord. No. 06-3349-PR, 2008
12
WL 5077004, at *2 (2d Cir. Nov. 26,2008) (unpublished) (applying Burlington Northern to ADA 
retaliation claim); Grubic v. City o f Waco. 262 Fed. Appx. 665,666-67 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) 
(unpublished) (same); Carmona-Rivera v. Puerto Rico. 464 F.3d 14,20 (1st Cir. 2006) (same); cf. 
Freilich v. Upper Chesapeake Health. Inc.. 313 F.3d 205, 216 (4th Cir. 2002) ('pre-Burlington 
Northern ADA retaliation case).
Williams contends that requesting a six-month medical leave o f absence in June 2007 
constitutes protected activity, and the court assumes (without deciding) that the request does 
constitute protected activity. See. e.g.. Haulbrook. 252 F.3d at 706. Nonetheless, her retaliation 
claim fails. First, the requested accommodation was a six-month medical leave o f absence, and the 
record demonstrates that Williams, in fact, received a medical leave o f absence from June 2007 to 
January 2008 even though she was not disabled under the ADA. Thus, she received the requested 
accommodation. Alternatively, even if  the court construes the requested accommodation to be 
Williams’ July 2007 request to the Board to remain as Director o f Pre-K and Student Services until 
she retired, her retaliation claim still fails. Both the ADA and Rehabilitation Acts require that a 
requested accommodation be reasonable on its face. See, e.g.. Hennagir. 587 F.3d at 1265 n.3. The 
Board, however, does not grant career tenure in a given position at the central office to anyone. See, 
e.g.. Milligan Aff. f  9; Hobbs. AfF. 6. Moreover, the Board was not required to violate this neutral 
policy by permitting Williams to remain as Director o f Pre-K and Student Services until retirement. 
See, e.g.. US Airways. Inc, v. Barnett. 535 U.S. 391,396-406 (2002); EEOC v. Sara Lee Corp.. 237 
F.3d 349,353-55 (4th Cir. 2001). Thus, when the Board rejected Williams’ facially unreasonable 
request to remain as Director of Pre-K and Student Services until retirement, the Board did not 
unlawfully retaliate against Williams. C f  Barnett. 535 U.S. at 396-406; Sara Lee Corp.. 237 F.3d 
at 353-55; see also Mavs v. Principi. 301 F.3d 866,872 (7th Cir. 2002) (an employer is not required 
to provide the particular accommodation that an employee requests); Jay v. Intermet Wagner Inc.. 
233 F.3d 1014,1017 (7th Cir. 2000) (same).
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Second, and in any event, a “reasonable accommodation” under the ADA is a modification 
or adjustment that enables a person with a “disability” to perform the essential functions o f the job. 
See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(l)(ii). The phrase “reasonable accommodation” does not mean that an 
employee gets whatever position she desires. See, e.g.. Barnett 535 U.S. at 396-406; Sara Lee 
Corp.. 237 F.3d at 353-55. Here, the record demonstrates that Williams could perform both as 
Director o f Pre-K and Student Services and as Dean o f Students at Shallotte Middle School. She 
simply preferred the Director position. Such personal preference is not a “reasonable 
accommodation” under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(ii),(iii). Finally, 
and in any event even under the more lenient adverse-employment action standard articulated in 
Burlington Northern, the lateral transfer does not constitute adverse employment action. See, e.g.. 
Scurlock-Ferguson v. City o f Durham. No. 09-1719,2010 WL 2255838, at * 1 (4th Cir. June 7,2010) 
(per curiam) (unpublished); Csicsmann v. Sallada. 211 Fed. Appx. 163, 168 (4th Cir. 2006) (per 
curiam) (unpublished). Furthermore, as already discussed, Williams cannot establish causation. 
Accordingly, the Board is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs retaliation claim under the 
ADA and Rehabilitation Act.
m.
As explained above, the court GRANTS the Board’s motion for summary judgment [D.E. 
32]. The Clerk o f Court is DIRECTED to close the case.
SO ORDERED. This 1  day o f July 2010.
r  A — '
JAMES C. D EV E R m
United States District Judge
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